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Abstract:
The fundamental function of the state is safeguarding the safety of its citizens. The
combination of Nozick’s invisible hand explanation with his theory of justice implies that
individuals can have full private property rights in the state. An individual with such
property rights thus has the right to sell and destroy what he or she owns. This implies
that it is perfectly fair to buy a state and dismantle it, thereby leaving citizens without
protection. I conclude that Nozick’s theory of the state fails since it cannot guarantee the
protection of its citizens’ safety.
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1. Introduction
Reading Robert Nozick is an adventure. Although you may ﬁnd yourself agree-
ing with almost everything or almost nothing, you cannot dispute the elegance
and creativity of his work. In this paper, I will discuss two fundamental parts
of Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974): the theory of the state and the
theory of justice. I will then argue that the combination of these two theories
spell trouble for invisible hand explanations in libertarian political philosophy.
This might seem like a somewhat odd project to undertake, given that the
Special Topic under consideration is ‘Can the Social Contract Be Signed by an
Invisible Hand?’ A topic of this nature might seem to raise primarily empirical
questions. However, as Lahno (2013) points out, there is a normative issue un-
derlying this question. I turn directly to the normative issue and ask what the
implications of the invisible hand account are if it succeeds. The starting point of
my argument is the following idea, widely shared from Hobbes and onwards: the
state should guarantee the protection of our safety. However, I shall then argue
that a theory that combines these two theories cannot guarantee such protec-
tion. The combination of Nozick’s theory of the state and his theory of justice
implies that the state can be bought and sold. It even implies the stronger the-
sis that it is entirely just to buy a state and then dismantle it. This means that
even if the mechanics of the invisible hand explanation work, it cannot provide
us with the result we want. The invisible hand signs the wrong contract.
In the next section, I will present Nozick’s invisible hand explanation and
justiﬁcation for the state, as well as his theory of justice. Section 3 presents my2 Lars Lindblom
argument that the state, according to Nozick’s theory, can be bought and sold.
Furthermore, I argue that this is a failure for a theory of the state. The fourth
section concludes this article.
2. Nozick’s Theories of Justice and of the State
Nozick’s alternative to theories of distributive justice is well known. In the place
of end-state and patterned theories, he prefers a historical theory. Such a the-
ory consists of three parts. First, there is a principle of justice in acquisition.
Here Locke’s Proviso plays an important role; you are allowed to appropriate a
thing if you leave enough and as good for others. If you have acquired something
justly out of the state of nature, you have full property rights to that something.
The second part of Nozick’s theory concerns trade. We do not gain property
rights only by taking things out of the state of nature. Most of the time, we
acquire property by trading with others. The principle of justice in transfer
thus explains the proper conditions for justiﬁed transfer of property rights. Es-
sentially, proper consent is required. If both parties are informed, uncoerced,
and in agreement, then they can exchange property rights in such a way that
justice is preserved. For Nozick, justice is fundamentally the protection of prop-
erty rights. Unfortunately, sometimes people try to obtain things in other ways,
which means that a third principle is needed. This is the principle of rectiﬁca-
tion. As its name indicates, the point of this principle is to see to it that injustices
are rectiﬁed. If property is stolen, it must be returned to the rightful owner.
There has been much discussion about the best way to interpret these prin-
ciples. For our purposes in the present argument it will not be necessary to dig
into thorny issues such as how to best interpret consent or the implications of
rectiﬁcation. However, we must examine the following two notions in greater de-
tail: the concept of property and the Lockean Proviso. Let us start with property.
If you acquire property in accordance with the two abovementioned principles,
you gain full property rights to whatever you have acquired. What then are full
property rights? Nozick characterizes property rights as “rights to determine
which of a speciﬁed range of admissible options concerning something will be
realized” (1974, 281–282). This is a version of the standard account of property
rights. What such accounts have in common is that they hold that property
consists in a bundle of rights. These rights standardly include the right to use,
trade, change, and destroy what one owns.1 If you own something you may use
it or sell it. What you may not do, however, is use your property to violate oth-
ers’ property rights. In Nozick’s classic example, your property rights to a knife
do not include the right to stab someone with it (Nozick 1974, 182). Moreover,
there is no overriding principle that would demand that you keep an object in
your possession if you want to sell it. The same goes for the right to change
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something you own. If the house is mine, then I have a right to repaint the liv-
ing room. Moreover, if it is my house I am in my rights to take it down if I so
choose. To stop me from tearing down a house I own would be an injustice. If
there is such a principle, it would come into conﬂict with justice, since justice, in
the Nozickian account, consists in property and property implies that you have
the right to sell, change, or destroy what you own.
How could we justiﬁably move from a state of nature, where everything is
unowned, to a situation where there is property? The Lockean Proviso plays
an important part in answering this question. It implies that one is allowed to
appropriate a thing from nature on the condition that one does not make any-
body else worse off by doing so, i.e., making somebody worse off than he or she
would have been in the state of nature. If somebody is worse off, then there is
not enough and as good left for others. If read strictly, however, every appro-
priation worsens the situation for others since there would be one less object to
appropriate. This is why Nozick argues that the Proviso should be understood
as applying to the system of property (as opposed to piecemeal appropriations).
He notes that “compensation would be due to those persons, if any, for whom the
process of civilization was a net loss” (Nozick 1974, note on page 179, emphasis
in original). For the purposes of this article the important thing to notice is that
the Lockean Proviso sets up a baseline—the situation in the state of nature—
against which claims of property rights are to be evaluated. This means that
there are two ways in which a holding can be unjust in Nozick’s theory, i.e.,
either by infringing on someone else’s right or by bringing someone below the
baseline of the Lockean Proviso.
We have started out by describing Nozick’s theory of justice, but as he notes,
“The fundamental question of political philosophy, one that precedes questions
of about how the state should be organized, is whether there should be any state
at all” (Nozick 1974, 4). At least since Hobbes, the standard answer has been
that the justiﬁcation of the state has its basis in its function to protect us. If
the state cannot protect our safety and our property rights, it fails at its most
fundamental task. Nozick shares this approach with the tradition; the state is a
protector of property rights. It is important to note here that property rights do
not only have to do with rights to things; we have property rights to our persons
as well. This means that, for example, assault should be understood as a crime
against your property rights to your own person. The state’s role then will be to
protect our property rights both to ourselves and to external objects.
For someone writing in the Lockean tradition it would seem natural to turn
to social contract theory for a justiﬁcation of the state; however, this is not the
case for Nozick. Since actual consent to such a contract seems incredible and,
furthermore, since “tacit consent isn’t worth the paper that it’s not written on”
(Nozick 1974, 287), this is not a viable option. Instead he prefers to think about
the state’s justiﬁcation in terms of an invisible hand explanation. Such an ex-
planation can be understood as follows:4 Lars Lindblom
“A theory of a state of nature that begins with fundamental general
descriptions of morally permissible and impermissible actions, and
of deeply based reasons why some persons in any society would vi-
olate these moral constraints, and goes on to describe how a state
would arise from that state of nature will serve our explanatory pur-
poses, even if no actual state ever arose that way.” (Nozick 1974, 7,
emphasis in original)
In order for this kind of justiﬁcation to work, it must show how the state, in a
recognizable form, can come about unintentionally through a process which re-
spects the rights of all individuals. Such an explanation would be fundamental.
An explanation is fundamental if it fully explains the political in terms of the
nonpolitical. This is why invisible hand explanations are particularly interest-
ing. Since they explain outcomes through unintended consequences, they do not
have to, and cannot, assume what is to be explained at any level. If one would
have to resort to assuming intentions in order to bring about the outcome on the
part of the agents, then what we have is neither an invisible hand explanation
nor a fundamental explanation. In other words, an invisible hand explanation
of the state cannot make use of an assumption that people want to bring about
a state. What must be shown is how the state comes into being without anyone
intending to bring it into existence.
However, it is not necessary to show that the state has actually come about
in this way. Nozick is looking for what he calls a fundamental potential expla-
nation, which can be law, fact, and process defective, yet still have signiﬁcant
explanatory power. A potential explanation is “what would be the correct expla-
nation if everything mentioned in it were true and operated” (Nozick 1974, 7).
Such an explanation can be fact defective in terms of the facts it makes use of,
the processes it assumes, and even in terms of the laws it uses. The idea is that
even if in the ﬁnal analysis the state must be explained in terms of power and
violence (or a will to justice for that matter), we learn about the nature of the
state through such fundamental potential explanations, particularly through
the kinds of invisible hand explanations that Nozick develops.
Nozick does not only want to explain the state; rather, he wants to show how
a certain kind of state can be given moral justiﬁcation. One could think that
taking an explanation as providing a justiﬁcation would be an obvious breach
of Hume’s Law, but Nozick’s strategy is much more subtle than it may initially
seem. The idea is that if an explanation of the state can be given which demon-
strates that it could have come about in a way that has respected all rights, then
the state is legitimate. Similar to how a distribution of goods brought about by
Adam Smith’s invisible hand is just, provided that it has come about without
breaches of any rights, the state is legitimate if an explanation can be given re-
garding how it could have come into existence without infringements of rights.
Nozick argues that “moral philosophy sets the background for, and boundaries
of, political philosophy” (Nozick 1974, 6). When this background is in place an
invisible hand explanation can perform its justiﬁcatory role.Anarchy, State, and Property 5
Nozick argues that the state could have come about through the following
ﬁve steps (Nozick 1974, 10–17; 22–25; 54–58.) We start from the state of nature,
which is to be understood in a more or less standard Lockean way. The state of
nature is mostly peaceful, but there is some crime and violence. Each person has
an individual right to punish criminals, whether the crime is committed against
them personally or if it is committed against some other person. Moreover, each
person is individually in charge of his or her own protection. Disagreements
about the interpretation of natural law, and hence proper punishments, will
lead to conﬂicts and therefore give rise to a need for an impartial third party to
adjudicate competing claims. The route toward the state begins here.
In step two, people ﬁnd that it is much more efﬁcient to form protective as-
sociations. Rather than having each person fending for herself, people cooperate
on a voluntary basis to defend themselves against crime. These associations will
adjudicate competing claims. This is clearly an improvement over the state of
nature. As a third step, the voluntary associations ﬁnd that it would be prefer-
able to outsource the protective work to private companies. It is more rational
for each individual to buy security services from a company than it is to take
part in a communal protective association.2 In this way people would be able to
avoid the inconvenience of having to take part in the neighborhood watch round.
Moreover, some people will be entrepreneurs and notice a business opportunity
for private security companies. What we have here is a standard example of the
division of labor. In these three steps, we have moved from a state of nature to
a world where security is handled by private companies.
Nozick has promised to show us how the state could be explained as coming
about through an invisible hand process, but at this point in the story there is
a multitude of different companies that compete for customers. How do we get
to the Weberian monopoly of legitimate violence? The story must continue. Step
four consists of the somewhat surprising argument that a free market for protec-
tive services will lead to a monopoly. The reason that there will be a monopoly on
protective services is that the value of this service is relative. If there is competi-
tion between different companies, it is better to be a customer with the stronger
ﬁrm since it will be in a better position to enforce one’s rights. This makes it
rational for each person to buy his or her protective service from the most dom-
inant company. And, of course, if each person buys from the same company, we
have a monopoly.
In Nozick’s terms, what we have is an ultraminimal state, which is not yet
a proper state, i.e., it is not a minimal state. It maintains a monopoly on force,
but provides its service only for those who pay for protection. This means that
one private company will have a monopoly in the sense that everyone that buys
protective services buys it from the same agency. But some people may prefer
not to buy such protection. Someone, who we will call Clint Eastwood, might
prefer to settle issues of justice privately and on his own. If this is the case, then
2 Note that if it were more rational to handle protection communally, the idea of a social contract
theory would be almost irresistible, because then the group cooperating would need a contract to
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the ultraminimal state will not have a monopoly on violence in the important
sense. Furthermore, it seems difﬁcult to see how it would gain such a monopoly
in a way that would make it legitimate. To solve this problem, at this ﬁfth and
ﬁnal step, Nozick invokes the principle of compensation, which “requires that
people be compensated for having certain risky activities prohibited to them”
(Nozick 1974, 83). To be compensated is to be made no worse off than one would
have been in the absence of the intervention; that is, to remain at the same
indifference curve. If the ultraminimal state forces Eastwood to stop enforcing
his rights in such a manner that he would judge himself no worse off than if
he had not been forced, then this enforcement is consistent with justice. The
way in which the state compensates Eastwood is by providing him with security
services. Therefore, this principle gives the ultraminimal state a justiﬁcation
for the kind of monopoly on legitimate force that is necessary in order to have a
proper state. What began as just another private company has now turned into
a monopoly on legitimate force. This is, then, how we can “Back into a State,
without Really Trying” (Nozick 1974, 1).
3. The Market for States
What is important and fascinating about Nozick’s justiﬁcation of the state is
how it shows how the state can come about without violating anyone’s rights.
However, this is also the seed of this theory’s greatest weakness. In this section,
I will show how the combination of this theory of the state and his theory of
justice leads to some problematic implications.
Property consists of a bundle of rights, and these rights include the right
to use, sell, and destroy. Justice demands that I should be allowed to use my
property as I see ﬁt. If I own Black Water Security, I have the right to decide
how to use this company, including the right to sell it or, if I wish, to dismantle
it. If we return to the third step of Nozick’s story, we will be able to identify
what kind of trouble this will create for his theory of the state. Let us assume
that I have exercised my entrepreneurial instincts and started a private secu-
rity company—Grey Water Security—and begin marketing it. The members of
neighborhood watch organizations start buying my services and the company is
up and running. At this point I have full property rights to my company. At step
four, the free market will have run its course and Grey Water Security will have
achieved a monopoly position in the geographical area we serve. This means
that there is a rudimentary state in place. However, nothing in Nozick’s theory
would indicate that I would lose rights by being successful. I would still have
full property rights in my company. I could still use, sell, or destroy my company
as I see ﬁt.
What about the ﬁfth and ﬁnal stage? Grey Water forces Eastwood to stop
enforcing his rights privately. That Grey Water is now a state has to do with it
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in itself does not imply that I will lose my property rights as the owner; it just
means that there is a legitimate way Grey Water could force Eastwood to comply
with its demands. To repeat, the compensation principle “requires that people
be compensated for having certain risky activities prohibited to them” (Nozick
1974, 83). The truth of this principle has no implications whatsoever for the
property rights of the owner of the state. If the compensation had any such
implications for property rights, this would probably undermine the invisible
hand argument. It would mean that there is a strong incentive for any owner to
remain at the stage of an ultraminimal state, since otherwise he or she would
lose property rights in the company. It seems irrational for an owner with a
monopoly to decide to give up property rights in order to compensate Eastwood.
That would amount to incurring a cost in order to incur a further cost. If we
must assume this kind of irrationality to explain the emergence of the state,
then it appears that we do not arrive at the proper kind of invisible hand ex-
planation. The conclusion must be that the state, according to Nozick’s invisible
hand theory, is a private company in which the owner has full property rights.
However, why can’t we assume irrationality? It is important to note that
people act rationally in Nozick’s account of the emergence of the state. I would
argue that there are two good reasons for this aspect of his explanation. First,
if we are allowed to assume irrationality, then potential explanations risk be-
coming both uninteresting and possibly ad hoc. This would be the case if we
assumed that the owner of the ultraminimal state would pay in order to incur
a further cost. Of course, it would not be irrational for the owner to incur this
cost if he would like to bring about a state. Perhaps he or she would like to do
so for moral reasons. We should not deny that people can act for moral reasons;
however, the explanation then runs into another problem. If we assume moral
intentions, then it stops being an invisible hand explanation. Second, assuming
irrationality drains Nozick’s account of normative interest. In his original ac-
count people have their preferences satisﬁed while rights are respected. If we
assume irrationality, the Pareto aspect of his account disappears. Therefore, we
should assume rationality.
The basic problem with Nozick’s account of the route out of the state of nature
is that it implies that a person can own the state; people can have justiﬁed
and just property rights in the monopoly of legitimate force. This is in itself
counterintuitive, but it also has absurd consequences. Property rights include
the right to sell and to destroy, which means that there will be individuals who
have a right to destroy the state for any reason as they see ﬁt. This would then
allow me to buy the Norwegian state (if I could ﬁnd the sufﬁcient funds) and
dismantle it out of spite. Very few people would, of course, have the means or
inclination to carry this out. However, the important point is that since property
rights guarantee that I can do as I please with my property, doing so would
be considered fully just according to Nozick’s theory. Some might argue that
the assumption I make here about how people would act is unrealistic. This
assumption about how people would act is used to illustrate a theoretical point.8 Lars Lindblom
If unwanted consequences could occur within the theoretical framework, then
this indicates a problem with the framework.
Moreover, if someone would try to stop me from disassembling the state, that
person would be guilty of an injustice. For instance, if I tell the police to stop
using the resources that I now own to capture a criminal but they persist in
pursuing and apprehending murderers, then they are violating my rights. They
become guilty of an injustice. It might not seem absurd that it is unjust to use
somebody else’s property, but in this case we are talking about property in the
state, the ﬁnal guarantor of justice. Moreover, while it would be an injustice to
hinder somebody from dismantling a just state, it could be fully just to dismantle
a just state. Implications do not get much more absurd in the context of political
philosophy.
But would not dismantling the state harm both its customers and Eastwood?
It would clearly be a setback, at least for the customers. However, in order for
such a setback to amount to a wronging it must either be a breach of rights or
a violation of the Lockean Proviso. Let us start with harm understood in terms
of violations of rights.3 The baseline consists of a person’s rights, and the idea
is that a person is harmed only if his or her rights are violated. However, if the
state can come about without the violation of any rights, it is hard to see how one
could make the case that harm is caused by someone not exercising his or her
rights. If neither the non-existence nor the existence of a state violates rights,
and the dismantling of the state is consistent with property rights, then there
is no harm. No rights are violated. Moreover, it would be strange to say that if
I stop producing something to the beneﬁt of my customers, I would harm them
in the sense that I have violated their rights. Obviously, a breach of contract is
another matter, which I will return to below.
What about the Lockean Proviso? It is not immediately clear how the Proviso
could cause problems for my argument. If the state is dismantled, then we have
a situation without any state, i.e., we are back in the state of nature. This means
that when we are asking if this dismantling would wrong anybody, we are in
essence asking if the state of nature is worse than the state of nature. The state
of nature is not worse than the state of nature. Therefore, the Lockean Proviso
is not breached.
For the case of Eastwood, it is difﬁcult even to identify any potential ground
for complaint. He has been forced to accept the protection of the state, and if
the state is dismantled, this ceases. It is hard to think that this would not be
experienced by Eastwood as an improvement, but ex hypothesi, he must remain
at the same indifference curve regardless of whether there is a state or not. Still,
there is no theoretical ground for saying that he will be harmed either in terms
of his rights or the Proviso.
Not only does this theory of the state lead to the absurd implications of own-
ership, it fails at perhaps the most fundamental task of a theory of the justi-
3 The particulars of Nozick’s theory of consent and the paramount importance of the issue of the
baseline are not discussed at any length in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. His theory in this area is
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ﬁcations of the state. This kind of state becomes fundamentally unstable. If
property rights in the state are granted, then we cannot be sure that the state
will continue to exist. Furthermore, we cannot be sure in what form it will con-
tinue to exist. It could be sold or dismantled at any point if the owner wishes to
do so. That the existence of a state could be held captive by the ﬂimsiest prefer-
ences of any person with enough resources to take control of it is an implication
of a theory of the state that just does not take the importance of the state seri-
ously. In order for the state to perform its fundamental function, it is necessary
that we know that it will continue to exist. How could we trust that contracts
will be enforced? Why would we refrain from punishing criminals ourselves if
we cannot be sure that the state will be there to perform this task? In other
words, what would stop us from returning to Locke’s state of nature? If such a
return is a viable option, then, in essence, we remain in the state of nature. This
is not a justiﬁcation of the state.
One way of countering this conclusion would be to deny that property rights
in the state consist of the full bundle of rights. For instance, why could we
not bargain away the rights to sell or destroy when hiring a private protective
agency? Obviously, this is a possibility, but there are several reasons why this
will not help Nozick’s theory. First, even if this is a possibility, it is not at all
certain that such a process would materialize; people might not succeed in ne-
gotiating such a result. There might be reasons of efﬁciency or market power
which lead customers to prefer a company that retains the right to sell or de-
stroy. If the company that provides the best security services refuses to budge
on this issue, then the process stops.4 The way that the invisible hand theory is
formulated implies that the development of the state will be path dependent. As
long as the path to a privately owned state is open, this is enough to show that
this is a problem for the libertarian, since there does not seem to be a way to
stop the conclusion that the ‘state’ could come about in such a way that it would
be privately owned.
A further problem, which is theoretically even more pressing, is that assum-
ing that people would try to bargain away the property rights to sell and destroy
must mean that they have formed an intention to do just that. But if we assume
such an intention, then we end up with something that is neither fundamental
nor an invisible hand explanation. The unique selling point of invisible hand ex-
planations was supposed to be that they do not assume what was to be explained.
It seems, therefore, that this attempt would have to assume that people would
have an intention of avoiding the problem that I have outlined. Trying to save
the invisible hand explanation by undermining it is not a feasible strategy.
Even if this strategy could be made to work in an invisible hand framework,
it would have to rely on a theory of human nature which assumes a very high de-
gree of foresight in people. People might insist on, say, ten-year contracts with
4 Note also that if people make different price/quality tradeoffs, it might not even be the case that a
monopoly will appear at the end of the invisible hand process. Perhaps one could say that people
will not engage in such tradeoffs, but it is hard to see what the justiﬁcation would be for saying
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the state, which would create some stability. Perhaps we have that ability to
look forward into the future, but I would probably be more concerned with se-
curity right here and now if I were in the state of nature than with what would
happen in the long term. It is difﬁcult to see that there could be a feasible ac-
count of human rationality that would imply this kind of focus on the long term.
The approach raises some further questions. First, what happens after the ten
years? An owner of Grey Water with a monopoly on force and an interest in
retaining control over his or her company could just refuse to renew that con-
tract. Second, when a monopoly has been achieved, why would new customers
get this contract? The monopolist would have no reason to make such an offer.
Even very long-term contracts would at some point become unstable. If con-
tracts were eternal, we would have the right kind of state, but it is very difﬁcult
to see how an invisible hand explanation could be constructed that would lead to
this result. Who would bargain for this? Would it be worth a higher price or in-
ferior service? Furthermore, could one develop an answer to these two questions
without assuming intentions that would undermine the fundamental character
of the explanation of the state? Maybe there is a way of spelling out a plausi-
ble account of rational choice that can answer such questions, but at present no
such theory has been developed.
In Nozick’s reductio of the welfare state, he argues against it by showing
that there is one very unattractive manner in which it might come into exis-
tence (1974, 280–292). By splitting up the bundle of property rights that people
have in themselves and then selling them, people can begin a process that ends
with them being owned by the state. However, if this unattractive counterfac-
tual history is reason to reject the welfare state, then consistency demands that
we reject Nozick’s state if it too can come about in an uninviting manner. What
Nozick aims to show is that the state could come about through an invisible hand
process, and that this in itself is reason enough to accept the minimal state. I
have demonstrated that Nozick’s own account of the invisible hand leads to an
unappealing account of the state. Consistency demands that we either reject
the libertarian state or give up on the project of justifying the state through
an invisible hand explanation. My argument, therefore, follows a strategy that
Nozick himself uses. Note also that since I use Nozick’s own assumptions, coun-
terarguments to the effect that my counterfactual history is unrealistic miss the
mark.
I have argued that the state, as construed by Nozick, can be bought and sold,
but who is in a position to sell? The short answer is he or she who founded the
company that went on to become the dominant protective agency and later the
state. However, couldn’t one think of more complex structures of ownership? If
the state is owned by all of its citizens, this may be a way of solving the prob-
lem of these counterintuitive implications. What if our property rights must be
managed democratically? However, this attempt to counter my argument has
several problems. First of all, it lacks an invisible hand account of how this own-
ership structure has come about. Second, if such an account could be developed
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seem to be rather severe transaction costs. Third, this account would also have
to steer clear of turning into a social contract theory. The invisible hand account
is supposed to be an alternative to that kind of theory. It cannot assume that
people have gathered to form a state. Fourth, it must be a fundamental expla-
nation. The intention to form a collectively owned state cannot be a part of the
explanation. And ﬁnally, the state must be owned in the right way. Even if the
state is owned by all citizens, it would seem that each individual citizen would
have his or her individual rights of property. And that would again give rise to
the problem that the state could be bought and sold. If I have stock in the state
of Norway, then I am, of course, free to sell this stock. Perhaps nothing but fully
socialized property can help Nozick.
4. Concluding Remarks
The most fundamental problem in political philosophy is the justiﬁcation of the
state. One of the most creative attempts to solve this problem is Robert Nozick’s
invisible hand argument. In this paper, I have shown that this argument suffers
from a fundamental problem: it implies that people can have standard property
rights in the state, which makes the kind of organization that appears at the
end of the invisible hand process unsuitable to serve as a state. Since Weber, we
have thought of the state as an organization that protects the rights of all within
its territory and which has a monopoly on legitimate violence. However, we have
also thought about it as an entity to which no one has property rights. Whether
Louis XIV actually ever said “L’État, c’est moi” or not, we continue quoting it
anyway since it is such a clear expression of deep corruption. Furthermore, the
state must guarantee stability. A state that could be dismantled at any moment
could never serve the functions that we would demand of a state. An unstable
state would not be able to guarantee that contracts would be enforced or that
criminal acts would be punished.
Although it is difﬁcult to see how one could develop a Nozickian invisible
hand account that gets around these problems, I have not demonstrated that
it is impossible. As things stand, however, we seem to have the following two
options: giving up the invisible hand explanation of the state or giving up the
theory of justice. The ﬁrst alternative means that Nozick is left without a theory
of the state, and the two open alternatives would seem to be 1) the anarchism
that we (and Nozick) would like to avoid or 2) opting for some form of social
contract theory, neither of which are palatable alternatives to a Nozickian liber-
tarian. Giving up at least some part of the theory of property is starting to look
like the better option, but this would essentially mean giving up a core tenet of
libertarianism. The issues raised by granting property rights in the state lead
us to a dilemma for libertarianism. If, like Nozick (and like most of us), one be-
lieves that the fundamental question of political philosophy is the justiﬁcation
of the state, libertarianism turns out to have some fundamental problems.12 Lars Lindblom
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